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he  Finance  Ministers  of  the  eurozone  have  finally  agreed  to  disagree.  Their 
compromise solution on the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is clearly incomplete 
and extremely complex. But these problems are likely to be resolved over time given 
that in future the resolution of large banks will be financed by a Single Resolution Fund 
(SRF).  
This common fund constitutes the key advance. It implies a considerable mutualisation of 
risks  and  will  require  changes  over  time  in  the  extremely  complex  decision-making 
mechanisms agreed today. The intergovernmental nature of the separate SRF Treaty is of 
course not ideal. But there was a real, albeit only ‘tail’ risk that the existing Treaty might not 
have  provided  a  sufficient  legal  basis  for  an  SRF  and  a  Resolution  Board  based  on  the 
Community institutions. But this is also likely to be revisited because the next ten years will 
give ample time to investigate all the legal problems and, hopefully, also allow for a revision 
of the Treaties which would put the banking union on a sound legal basis. 
The  decision-making  mechanism  of  the  future  Resolution  Board  is  so  complex  that  in 
practice it will work quite differently from what one would imagine by looking at the formal 
rules. In an emergency the people with the necessary information will decide and all the 
others who are formally also involved will probably just have to agree. 
Today’s SRM compromise is also incomplete because there is no explicit agreement on how 
to provide the SRF with a backstop in case of a really large crisis. But once the SRF is up and 
running, the incentives will change. At that point the member states participating in the 
SRM/SRF will have a common interest in backing up their common investment in case of 
need. 
It will take some time (ten years) for the SRF to reach its target of €55 billion. But a long 
transition period was unavoidable given that one could not expect the creditor countries to 
accept  a  mutualisation  of  the  risks  from  the  past.  The gradual  increase  in  the  degree  of 
mutualisation agreed corresponds exactly to the proposal made by Gros & Schoenmaker 
(2012). 
The size of SRF has often been criticised as being insufficient. But this is wrong. A fund of 
€55 billion would be enough to resolve all but the very largest banks in Europe; and would 
also be sufficient to deal with even a systemic crisis in small- to medium-sized countries 
(Spain needed €40 billion from the ESM). 
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The SRM is of course relatively small compared to the overall assets of SSM banking system 
(which amount to over €25,000 billion) and also small relative to the overall capital of the 
sector (about €1,000 billion). But one cannot expect a resolution fund to deal with the chronic 
undercapitalisation of the European banking sector (see also Gros, 2013). The resources of the 
SRF will be significant relative to the capitalisation of most individual banks (the 30 German 
banks directly under the SSM have on average a capitalisation of only €10 billion). Moreover, 
the resources of the SRF will loom large relative to the budget of any single member state, 
bar the largest ones. 
Any restructuring fund can only be a first-aid kit dealing with a single accident. A systemic 
crisis always requires a fiscal back-up. Implicitly this exists as experience has shown; when 
there was a need for public funds, they were found. The process was of course slow and 
cumbersome and this made the crisis even worse. But this memory is likely to lead to an 
agreement that the natural backstop of the SRF must be the ESM whose full lending capacity 
should be available once the current programmes have ended and been reimbursed.  
This compromise on the SRM is an inelegant step in the right direction. It leaves as many 
problems  unresolved  as  it  addresses.  The  riders  on  the  European  bicycle  will  have  to 
continue to pedal for some time.  
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